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ARGUING FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY
Egalitarians suffer from a typical
philosophical confusion. We know that we
believe in equality, but we don't seem to be
able to say what equality is. Part of the
reason, no doubt, is that there are genuine
disputes about what equality involves. But in
the first part of this paper, I will argue that a
central reason is that egalitarianism is a
rather complex system of beliefs which upsets
several philosophical prejudices. Various
pictures 'hold us captive', so that we are
unable to see the character of the
belief-system before us.l By uncovering this
complexity and these prejudices we may hope
to avoid the idea that egalitarianism must be
of a certain form. We will then be free to
engage in the really difficult work of giving
an adequate account of what egalitarianism
is. The second part of this paper is an attempt
to do some of this work in connection with the
idea of economic equality. In Part III, I say a
little about how I would argue in favour of the
conception of economic equality so
2developed.
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PART I: What equality is not
1.1. Egalitarianism is not a belief in a single
principle
The first prejudice philosophers are
likely to have is the idea that egalitarianism
must be a belief in a single principle. Nobody
would think that about Christianity or
Buddhism, but then they have the advantage
that their names derive from the name of a
founder and not a concept. Yet these
examples remind us that names of systems of
belief are inevitably forms of shorthand. They
need to be deciphered.
What, then, are we to make of the name
'egalitarianism'? Not that it is a belief in a
single, simple thing called equality, but that
the beliefs it involves do somehow derive
from or revolve around that concept. It is
perfectly intelligible to suppose that
egalitarianism comprises a number of beliefs,
each of which can be construed somehow as a
principle of equality. There is no need for
them to have any more in common than that
(cf. PI 65).
If we look at the beliefs of people who
consider themselves egalitarians, we actually
][][][][][][][ 2 m0[][][][][
find a variety of principles. Here are some of
the beliefs I'd include (see Baker 1987: ch.1)
(1) Everyone has the right to the satisfaction
of their basic needs; in a good society
everyone would have not just a bearable
existence, but the prospect of a satisfying,
fulfilling life.
(2) No one should be degraded or exploited.
Everyone should have the same social status.
(3) There should be much more equality of
income and wealth. There should be equality
in production, involving democratic control of
the economy and of the workplace, and the
right of everyone to safe, dignified, useful,
and engaging work. Everyone should be able
to develop their individual talents in a
satisfying and fulfilling way.
(4) Civil rights like free speech and free
assembly should be defended, but institutions
should be developed to give formal freedoms
real bite, and to give their members equal
power.
(5) No one should be treated worse than
others because of their sex or sexual
preference, their colour or culture, their
religion or lack of it, or for any other
irrelevant reason.
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Of course, not every contemporary
egalitarian will subscribe to just these beliefs,
but I am reasonably confident that most
real-life egalitarians would have a set of
beliefs at this level of complexity.
Now, for many practical purposes, such
a radical ideal might well be called an ideal
of equality of outcome or condition, to
distinguish it from weaker ideals. That can be
a convenient and harmless way of
summarizing a complex view. But when
philosophers are confronted with this
complexity, they tend to say that it is
derivative of some more fundamental and
simpler belief which is the essence of
egalitarianism. The problem is that none of
the candidates proposed for this role is up to
the job. Consider the principle of equal
well-being put forward by Mortimore (1968).
It is a plausible principle, but it clearly goes
considerably beyond the beliefs I have listed.
Egalitarians, as far as I can see, are simply
not committed to rectifying every cause of
inequality of well-being (political frustration,
expensive tastes, philosophical ennui) --
which is what makes these so useful to
Dworkin (1981) in his attack on equal
welfare. And although egalitarians are
m[][]mHH 4 m []mm [][
sensitive to systematic or extreme differences
in esteem, affection, job-satisfaction, and
overall contentment with life, they are by no
means committed to evening out these
differences completely. All that can really
plausibly be said is that some egalitarian
beliefs involve something like equal
well-being within limited spheres: for
instance, the belief in satisfying basic needs
might be construed as a belief that everyone
should be brought up to the same level of
basic well-being.3
If equal well-being is too strong a
principle, then equality of resources in the
form defended by Dworkin (1981) is too weak.
Dworkin's theory is essentially a refinement of
the liberal idea of equality of opportunity.
Although he distances himself from what he
calls the 'starting gate theory of justice',
'resources' here are still things which people
use to further their interests in a manner
which could lead to major inequalities of
need-satisfaction, life-fulfilment, status,
income, and economic power, and thus to
results well outside what is typically
countenanced by egalitarians. Dworkin
rightly argues that any theory of equality must
go beyond pre-analytic dogma, but his theory
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moves so far away from everyday
egalitarianism that it fails to count as an
elucidation of that outlook at all.
A third single-principle theory is that
everyone should have a roughly equal level of
the kinds of thing Rawls (1972) calls primary
social goods. By contrast with Dworkin, this
could be seen as an equality of 'results' rather
than of 'opportunity', although that
terminology is not wholly satisfactory because
some primary goods are themselves
opportunities. It would include, for instance,
equality of income and wealth, of access to
health care and to educational provision, of
political power, of social status. And surely
this is closer to real-life egalitarianism than
the two principles already considered. But it
is still a long way from the truth. For
instance, it does not adequately encompass a
commitment to the satisfaction of very
different needs, nor does it seem to make
room for the egalitarian ideal that everyone
should have access to a satisfying occupation
and to an appropriate education. These areas
of egalitarianism are all sensitive to
differences between people which call for
differences in material provision and therefore
for differences in primary social goods. That
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is only to say that the strengths and
weaknesses of this principle are
complementary to those of equal well-being.
Equality of well-being takes into account too
many personal differences, equality of goods
too few.
There is no guarantee that other
candidates for single-principle egalitarianism
will meet the same fate, but the examples
given so far should raise our suspicions.4 For
real-life egalitarianism manages to combine
some of the aspects of each single principle it
is supposed to be based on. It may be argued
that such an eclecticism runs the risk of
confusion and inconsistency, but that doesn't
make equality impossible. If the context
makes the content of an egalitarian's outlook
reasonably clear, if the potential conflict
among its elements is containable, and if
there are theoretical resources available for
sorting out particular conflicts in particular
ways, egalitarianism can manage to survive.
But where are these resources? Are they not
part of egalitarianism itself? This brings me
nicely to the second claim I wish to defend.
1.2. Egalitarianism is not a belief in an
'ultimate principle'
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Utilitarianism and several other moral
theories are identified in terms of their
allegedly ultimate principles. It seems
natural to imagine that egalitarianism is of
the same form: that at its base is some
ultimate principle from which all its other
characteristics follow. But the image is
illusory, and not just because equality is not a
single principle.
The main reason that it is illusory is
simply that there are no such ultimate
principles. This is not the place to argue the
general position against foundationalism (for
examples of which, see Baker 1980, Lovibond
1983, or Williams 1985). But the case can be
illustrated by looking at a principle which is
often taken to be the fundamental principle of
equality, namely equal respect. First of all,
that principle is extremely general and open
to interpretation; thus its simple appearance is
misleading. According to some philosophers,
it stands for only the most minimal form of
respect (Lucas 1977), while for egalitarian
authors it is even at the start much more
robust. Secondly, the most common way of
supporting it as a fundamental principle is
hopelessly incomplete (see Williams 1962,
Rawls 1972, and Lukes 1977 for examples).
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The argument always comes to a halt with
just the claim which needs to be justified:
that the particular common human
characteristics which are supposed to 'entitle'
or 'command' or 'elicit' respect (the words are
all Lukes's) really do so. But this is the kind
of thing that always happens when you try to
conjure a belief out of thin air: you end up, at
best, with an enthymeme, and at worst with
an incantation.
Taken as an enthymeme, the argument
might be seen as follows:
(1) All humans have the capacity to think,
to make decisions, to pursue activities they
find fulfilling, and so on. (Well, almost all.)
(2) These capacities are all very valuable.
(First suppressed premise, which is itself an
ethical judgment.)
(3) Anything with valuable properties
deserves our respect. (Second suppressed
premise, and another ethical judgment.)
Therefore,
(4) All humans are worthy of respect.
Once anyone sees the cans of worms
opened up by that way of reading the
argument, they might well be forgiven for
retaining it as an incantation only. But the
positive point to note is that it is indeed
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possible to provide arguments for so-called
fundamental principles, but only by using
other principles which are themselves open to
further justification. 'Justification comes to an
end', not at fundamental principles, but at the
point at which, in a particular context and
with a particular audience, it suffices to
justify (cf. PI 326, 485). That point,
obviously, will be different on different
occasions.
What, then, are we to make of the
natural idea that some principles of equality
are more fundamental than others? The idea
is all right as a general rule; what is wrong is
trying to put too much weight on it. To say
that one principle is more fundamental than
another means only that the first is a reason
for the second but not vice versa. That can
vary according to context, and it will fail to
order such principles as are mutually
reinforcing. The foundational style of thinking
thus ignores the way in which, for instance,
the principles of need-satisfaction and mutual
respect can support each other (Baker 1987:
18, 24).
But the urge to conceive egalitarianism
in terms of fundamental principles is not only
an instance of a general philosophical
lD 0 [][][] m 1 0 ][] [][]O 0m
mistake. It also leads egalitarians to
over-simplify what distinguishes them from
other points of view. The difference becomes
a single difference, when in reality it is
composed of a multitude of specific
differences, held together by a whole network
of reasons. And although these reasons are
indeed mutually reinforcing, they are by no
means so monolithic as to constitute an
outlook which has a single alternative.
Instead, we find in the real world a wide
range of more or less anti-egalitarian
positions, as well as a great diversity among
egalitarian views. This diversity becomes
easier to understand when we recognise that
forms of egalitarianism are not all simply
different interpretations of the same
fundamental idea. For how could a single
idea have so many interpretations? And if
only a few, how could these few lead
intelligent people to such widely divergent
conclusions? The answer to all these
questions lies in abandoning their common
presupposition, and in recognising that each
version of egalitarianism is a complex
network of beliefs supported by a complex
network of argument.
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The foundational conception of
egalitarianism is also a practical liability. It
creates the impression that the case for
equality must be conducted in very abstract
terms, remote from everyday moral thinking.
For that is the level at which general
justifications for 'respect for persons' and
similar principles must proceed. By contrast,
I tried to show in Arguing for Equality that the
case for equality can be made in terms of
very ordinary beliefs, beliefs which you don't
have to be a philosopher to understand. The
argument can thus simply by-pass the areas in
which philosophers have sought to confine it,
and instead of talking generally about respect
for persons, it can employ more specific
principles -- for instance, the principle that
people are not to be degraded or exploited.
Even those principles are open to
interpretation, and the argument is liable to
break down. But without some specificity, it
will never even get started.
1.3. Egalitarianism is not an immutable
doctrine
The idea that egalitarianism is a belief
In a single, fundamental principle goes well
with a third philosophical prejudice -- that
][] mU][] m 1 2 ][] [][] [][] m
egalitarianism is a timeless, changeless
doctrine. By contrast, a pluralist and
anti-foundationalist approach allows~for a
view of egalitarianism as a changing
tradition, each stage of which is a natural
outgrowth of the last, but in which no stage is
privileged as a final wisdom.
Philosophers are liable to see these
stages as expressions of a single programme,
and to assume that 'egalitarianism' must stand
for a fixed set of beliefs, however complex
and non-foundational: a standard against
which all other beliefs may be compared (cf.
PI 67-68). There is something right in this
view and something wrong. What is right is
that from any particular perspective in the
history of equality, some views are going to
be more egalitarian than others. Thus, for
instance, the belief in equal opportunity, once
at the forefront of egalitarianism, is now, in
truth, a rather inegalitarian belief. This kind
of unfolding of a tradition does not have to be
conceptualised in terms of an ultimate idea to
which various stages only approximate. It can
be seen, unmetaphysically, as a process in
which certain ways of thinking, combined
with social change, lead on to new ways of
thinking. What makes all these ways
lD D[][][] m 13 ][] [][]O []m
egalitarian is not that they have the same
content, but that they do lead, and have led,
from one to another and that the term
'equality' has continued to have a central role
in their expression.
104. The principles of equality are not of the
same logical form
The final claim I want to make in the
first part of this paper is that the principles of
equality take at least four different forms.
The first, obvious, form is the equal division
of a particular good. Thus, for instance,
egalitarians believe that everyone should
have one vote in an election,5 and, more
generally, certain equal rights. But another
obviously egalitarian kind of principle is the
rejection of certain forms of discrimination.
Someone who rejects racial or sexual
discrimination is not necessarily calling for
the equal distribution of any particular good.
Thus the two forms are quite distinct.
Many principles of equality fall into one
of these two categories. Raz (1978) has tried
to demonstrate this rather formally, and I
think that with a little squeezing even the rich
complexity of principles listed by Rae et al
(1981) could be so accommodated. But I
]0 0 [][][] or 14 ][] [][]O0 or
think Raz is wrong in excluding a third
category of principle -- principles of universal
entitlement. For it seems clear to me that
egalitarianism does include, for example, the
universal right to the satisfaction of basic
needs and the right not to be degraded or
exploited. Raz's central objection to
including such rights is that principles of this
form are not always egalitarian -- but this is
true, as well, of principles of equal
distribution (e.g. equal food or, indeed, equal
welfare).
Principles of universal entitlement are
egalitarian because they highlight, within a
particular context, situations in which some
people enjoy the good in question while
others do not. This may suggest that the
strictly egalitarian content of such principles
is a principle of non-discrimination -- if some
people have x, then all should -- but as Raz
points out, principles of non-discrimination
are just as well served by denying x to
everyone. That is clearly not the intention of
the principles mentioned above.
The fourth form of egalitarian principle
is perhaps the hardest for philosophers to take.
It states that a certain good should be more
equally distributed, without in the least
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committing itself to complete equality. The
best example is the principle of greater
equality of income -- a principle shared by all
contemporary egalitarians, although hardly
anybody believes in strictly equal incomes.6
What counts as 'more equal' is sometimes a
difficult question. But principles of more
equality are a standard feature of the
egalitarian tradition. Happily, they are also
the ultimate testimony to its pluralistic,
non-foundational, and mutable character.
PART II: Elements of an account of economic
equality
11.1. Basic ideas
In the good old days, everyone knew
what economic equality was. It was everyone
having the same income. This idea is indeed
an important benchmark for egalitarianism,
but obviously will not do as a full account of
economic equality. For egalitarians have
always recognised that unequal incomes
would be justified if people had unequal
needs. There is also a strong egalitarian
tradition that unequal incomes would be
justified if they did no more than compensate
people for differences in their work. It is this
1O0 [][][] m 1 6 ][] [][]O 0m
issue of compensation which I'd like to talk
about here. I shall refer to such a scheme as
a system of compensating differentials. In
concentrating on this issue, I will abstract
from many other elements of economic
equality; not just the satisfaction of needs, but
also the principles of democratic control, of
access to decent work and self-development
(which includes freedom of occupational
choice), and of sexual, racial, and ethnic
equality.
The form of equality which best captures
and informs the idea of compensation is, I
think, that of an equality in the overall
benefits and burdens of economic cooperation.
Since, in general, we have to think of work as
more or less burdensome and of income as
beneficial, such an equality will generally
take the form of a system of compensating
differentials. The question immediately
arises, however, as to how well defined any
such equality can be, since people do differ
dramatically in their preferences among
different forms of work, as well as on the
relative values they attach to income and
leisure. What sense can be left to the very
idea of an overall equality?
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I don't want to deny the difficulties here;
and yet, it would be outrageous to conclude
from them that a corporate executive with an
income of half a million dollars a year cannot
be compared with an unemployed parent
living on welfare benefits. The problem,
however, is to establish reasonable terms for
comparison. Now, for well-known reasons, we
cannot resolve the issue simply by setting
incomes so as to equalize welfare. For much
the same reason, we cannot try to compensate
each person according to their individual
preferences between different kinds of work
and between work and leisure: we would end
up, for instance, compensating people's
deliberately chosen 'expensive' preferences
against certain kinds of work or against work
in general.
It is intuitively more plausible to think of
compensating people according to some
function of the complete set of individuals'
preferences. For instance, we could set each
occupation's rates of pay according to what
the typical person (defined by mean or
median or mode) would consider to be an
adequate level of compensation for a given
number of hours.? Or we could set a range of
legitimate rates of pay for each occupation,
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where the range was defined, say, by the
middle two quartiles of preferences. Such
proposals have their attractions, but also their
problems. If a reliance on individUal
preferences has been rejected because,
among other things, it pays inadequate
attention to people's responsibility for their
own preferences and overall aims in life, then
why should such preferences enter into the
determination of compensation at all, even by
way of averaging? People's preferences about
work will be shaped by many factors which
for just this reason it is intuitively implausible
to compensate for, such as a personal taste
between teaching English and teaching
French, or a desire to carryon a family
tradition. The impact of these matters may
well disappear in the process of averaging,
but there seems to be a good reason in
principle for not including them in the first
place.
These last remarks suggest a procedure
similar to that adopted by Braybrooke (1987:
ch. 2) in his treatment of needs, namely to
begin by making a list of the kind of
consideration which egalitarians will want to
consider in thinking about compensation
('matters of compensation') and then to apply
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this list to particular occupations to establish
levels of compensation. Matters of
compensation will include the kind of thing
people have in mind when they distinguish
between 'impersonal' or 'objective' benefits
and burdens on the one hand and 'personal' or
'subjective' needs and preferences on the
other (cf. Norman 1987: 81-82). On the
burdens side, some obvious candidates for
compensation include whether the work is
unavoidably dangerous, tiring, stressful,
tedious, dirty, isolated, or of low status.
Some plausible examples of objective
benefits are job security, flexibility of hours,
and degree of autonomy.
As with need, the use of the concepts of
benefit and burden as publicly accepted
justifications for the distribution of income
presupposes a common understanding, that is,
a broad consensus over how the idea of
compensation is to be applied. What this
requires is not a complete agreement on the
truth of every claim of compensation, but
what can be called a background agreement
defined in terms of what people can accept as
reasonable claims, motivated not just by their
own direct assessment of these claims but by
their commitment to democracy and therefore
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their willingness to accept as reasonable the
views of a substantial majority of their fellow
citizens. The degree of applicability of the
principle of compensation will be governed by
the degree of any such consensus: the more
attitudes converge over matters and levels of
compensation, the more scope there will be
for arguing in detail about the justice of
particular income differentials. Perhaps the
degree of disagreement will make it
implausible to think about anything more than
a rough equality defined in terms of ranges or
bands of legitimate incomes for different
broad categories of work. At the limit, there
may be no more agreement than that no job is
so burdensome that it requires more than five
times average earnings in compensation.
Even that would create a significant social
role for the principle of compensation.
It is not my aim in this paper to discover
whether the attitudes on compensation in
contemporary societies are sufficiently
congruent to make a system of compensating
differentials a practicable standard for
assessing the justice of a distribution of
income. The shift from preferences to matters
of compensation would seem to provide some
reason for optimism, since even among
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people with diverse conceptions of well-being
and sets of preferences there may be
considerable agreement over what count as
objective benefits and burdens, or at least
over the reasonableness of such claims. It
seems likely that there would be less
agreement over what would count as
reasonable financial compensation for such
benefits and burdens; but here again it is not,
I hope, wholly implausible to expect people's
views to fall within a fairly limited range, or
to think that they might be prepared to accept
certain procedures or arbitrations as fair
processes for establishing levels of
compensation. We should remember that we
are talking about real societies with
considerably less real diversity than some
versions of liberalism presuppose. But all of
these are empirical issues which lie beyond
the scope of this paper. My point at present is
only that the degree of consensus does matter
for the usefulness of compensation as a
publicly acceptable criterion of justice. It is
also worth emphasizing that what is in
question here is the construction of principles
for assessing the equality of a distribution of
earnings, not the development of institutions
for implementing these principles. In what
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follows, I will assume that a very precise
consensus exists because this makes the
expOSItIOn easier, but it is important to
remember that even this degree of background
agreement does not represent identical
preferences but only a shared belief that a
certain set of differentials constitutes a set of
reasonable levels of relative compensation
with respect to a reasonable list of objective
benefits and burdens.
II.2 Compensation maps
What can we say, in general, about the
nature of such compensation? The first point
worth making is that the amount of income
necessary to compensate for any form of work
will in general be an increasing function of
the number of hours of work done: the more
work, the more pay. ('In general', because
this assumes that more work is always more
burdensome, which may not always be the
case.) Moreover, since we can in general
assume that income has a decreasing
marginal value and that time spent on work
has an increasing marginal onerousness, we
can plausibly suppose that there is an
increasing marginal rate of compensation
between income and hours of burdensome
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work. Finally, levels of compensation will
always be relative to points of comparison:
adequate compensation for an additional five
hours' work will depend on prior levels of
work and income.
It might occur to anyone who knows
even a little economics that what I have been
describing can be represented by means of a
kind of indifference map, the curves of which
represent equalities of overall benefits and
burdens.8 Figure 1 illustrates such a map for
a particular kind of work.
income
(corn)
5
hours worked
Figure 1. A compensation map for one kind of work
I shall henceforth call this a
compensation map and its curves
compensation curves. My use of such maps
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will be purely informal and heuristic. Note
that it makes perfectly good sense for such
curves to terminate on the left at points of no
work and some income ('no-work points'), a
matter to which we will return. It is also
worth noting that the map is effectively
bounded by some curve S, not itself a
compensation curve, which represents bare
subsistence. Below S the compensation
function is (to put it delicately) simply
undefined.9
Let us now consider how the idea of
compensating differentials ought to work in a
very simple case, where we have two people
producing a single good with a common
productivity.lO The elements of the situation
are a compensation map and a production
function, as in Figure 2.
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income
(com)
Ya
product
(com)
Compensation
map
hours worKed
Production
function
..va hours worKed
Figure 2. An egalitarian dic;tribution for two people
with one kind of worK and l:ommon productivity
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Egalitarian distributions consist in A and
B being on the same curve of the
compensation map, constrained by total
production. Thus, for instance, if A works wa
hours and B works wb' the total product is
P = Pa + Pb. An egalitarian distribution is
generated if P is divided as Ya and Yb. We
can perhaps see the relationship between
product and income more clearly if we
superimpose the production function on the
compensation map, as in Figure 3.
income/
product
(corn)
Wa hours wor1<ed
Figure 3. Another representation of Figure 2
In the illustrated case, A's production
subsidizes B's consumption so that the two
individuals end up equally well off. Note that
nothing has been said about what counts as an
optimal egalitarian distribution. In particular,
it cannbt be assumed that an optimal
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distribution occurs when both parties are at
point Q, unless our aim is to maximize the
overall level of objective benefits and burdens
for each individual regardless of personal
preferences. That, however, is an unlikely
. 11aIm.
If we extend the example to include two
forms of work, we get a compensation map as
in Figure 4.
income
(corn)
a c
bl-----
- work 1
--work2
Figure 4. A compensation map for two kinds of work
hours worked
Here work 1 is generally less
burdensome than work 2. Note that the line
abc constitutes for our purposes a single
compensation curve, since all of the points on
this curve are considered equal in overall
benefits and burdens to point b. Points on the
vertical axis -- no-work points -- thus have a
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income/
product
(corn)
- work 1
-- work2
special analytical role in comparing levels of
compensation. Figure 5 represents an
egalitarian distribution in which both forms of
work are equally productive, A does work 1
and B does work 2. B's income is in this case
subsidized by A's less burdensome work.
wb wa hours worked
Figure 5. Egaliitarian distribution for two people
with two kinds of work and common productivity
To complete our survey of the simplest
forms of compensation, consider a case
(Figure 6) of one form of work with two
different levels of productivity, perhaps due to
different levels of skill. Pea) is A's production
curve and PCb) is B's. Here it is A's greater
productivity which subsidizes B's income so
that A and B are again left equally well off as
defined by the compensation map.
m0 [][][] Of 29 ][][][lD 0 Of
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product
(corn)
P(a)
hours worked
Figure 6. Egalitarian distribution for two people
with one kind of work and two productivities
All of this discussion has been for the
sake of defining what equality might mean;
how to interpret the very idea of an equality
of overall benefits and burdens. I have said
nothing in this paper about what economic
practices (if any) would generate such an
outcome.12 In particular, I want to leave it
entirely open whether given certain
assumptions the best feasible approximation
to implementing a system of compensating
differentials would rely heavily on market
mechanisms. My aim is to clarify the
question of how we should assess the equality
of a distribution of earnings, not how we
should put one into operation.
lO 0 [][][] or 30 ][] [][lO 0 or
lDO[][][]O[ 31 ][][][]OOO[
III. Arguing for Economic Equality
In the rest of this paper I want to say
something about how to argue for much
greater economic equality, as interpreted in
Part II. In Arguing for Equality I divide the
general case for equality into two parts. Part I
consists of the basic case for equality. Part II
considers some more controversial issues,
such as whether equality is compatible with
freedom and desert. My question here is too
see how well these general arguments apply
to the specific issue of a system of
compensating differentials.
The basic case for equality, I maintain,
relies on the ideas of need, respect, and
community, so let us take those in turn.
Provision for needs requires, as we have seen,
that incomes vary according to need. It
thereby justifies one kind of departure from
equal incomes. Such departures nevertheless
can be thought of as necessary for
maintaining an equality of overall condition.
Once basic needs are met, however, it may
be doubted whether the idea of need calls for
so stringent an equality as that defined by a
system of compensating differentials. In my
view the connection is an empirical one. It is
that a society which tolerates substantial
inequality of economic condition -- of overall
benefits and burdens -- is unlikely to sustain a
commitment to satisfying the needs of
everyone. For a start, the better off are likely
to lack real sympathy with the worse off; at
the same time, they are well placed to
influence social policy in a way which
institutionalizes this lack of sympathy.
Admittedly this empirical belief is at odds
with generations of social democrats who
believe that it is possible to combine a
welfare-state safety net with huge
inequalities. All I can say is that there is
little evidence that this political programme
is sustainable. Certainly it has been
substantially undermined in practically every
country in which it has been applied.
The argument from respect has a similar
character. Practically everybody these days
says that they believe in equal respect, but
there is precious little evidence of this respect
when you look out the window. My argument
is that it is utopian to expect people of
dramatically superior economic
circumstances to sustain any real respect for
the worst off. There are various reasons for
this, ranging from their inclination to justify
their privileges by denigrating the
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unprivileged to their susceptibility to using
their bargaining power to exploit the
vulnerability of the weak.
The argument from community relies,
again, on empirical observation, this time
about the lack of a sense of social unity and
common interest in a highly unequal society.
It is a truism of sociology that different
classes develop different cultures and tend to
see each other as alien and incomprehensible.
If we care about a sense of community and a
common culture -- and admittedly only some
of us care very much about them -- then we
have a good reason for creating a society in
which the benefits and burdens of economic
activity are much more equally shared.
Without intending to rehearse even the
central arguments of the second part of my
book, I think it would be useful to connect a
few of them to the main issues I have been
talking about. One set of arguments has to do
with desert. Unlike some egalitarians, I am
not wholly skeptical about the idea of desert.
I am sure that the Center for the Study of
Ethics in Society deserves my thanks for
inviting me to Kalamazoo, that George Bush
deserves to lose the 1992 election, and that
the Grand Canyon deserves its reputation.
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What I doubt is that the kinds of reason which
justify such claims do anything to justify the
scale of inequality we have in our society.
When I doubt whether the chief executive of
General Motors deserves his income, that is
not a general skepticism about desert but a
skepticism about the validity of the grounds
which are offered in defence of that and
similar desert claims. More pertinently to rest
of this paper, I do believe in one kind of
economic desert, namely that people who
work hard deserve to be compensated for it.
That belief is completely consistent with the
idea of compensating differentials: it
represents, in fact, a convergence between
the basic case for equality and the principle
of desert.
Turning to the issue of freedom and
equality, let me say fIrst of all that my basic
position on this is the standard egalitarian
one, namely that people's freedom to control
their own lives is very largely dependent on
their material conditions, and that the
difference between economic equality and
inequality is simply the difference between
promoting some people's freedom at the
expense of others' and promoting the freedom
of all. What is special about the idea of a
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system of compensating differentials, as
opposed to some popular images of equality,
is the way that it respects two forms of
freedom which opponents of equality claim
only to be respected in an inegalitarian
society. First, it respects the principle of
freedom of occupational choice. It does not
enslave the talented; but unlike our society, it
does not enslave the poor, either. Secondly,
it allows for a wide range of choice over
preferences between consumption and leisure.
Obviously an egalitarian society would not
sustain today's lifestyles of the rich and
famous, but on my view it would allow people
with champagne tastes to work harder than
others for more income, and let people with a
preference for leisure work less and have
lower incomes. Thus the image of an
egalitarian society as a society of dull
uniformity is completely contrary to the
principles I've been expounding.
Let me finally say something about the
argument, popularly associated with Rawls13,
that inequality can benefit everyone by
providing the incentives necessary to ensure
that talented people go where they're needed
and that workers make a real effort in their
jobs. I cannot pursue this question here, but I
will make one point. Egalitarianism is
standardly accused of reducing the incentive
to work, on the assumption that people will be
paid the same whether they work or not.
Under a system of compensating differentials,
however, that assumption is false. Thus, at
the very least, people would have less
disincentive to work within such a system
than in a system of equal incomes. There is
much more to be said about the whole issue
of incentives -- some of which I try to say in
my book -- but that would go well beyond the
immediate concerns of this paper.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to do something
negative and something positive. The
negative work was to clear away certain
philosophical prejudices which stood in the
way of constructing an adequate egalitarian
theory. The positive work was to make a
small contribution to deciding what we mean
when we talk about balancing out income and
work, and to say something about the
arguments available for supporting that
account of economic equality. I hope I have
at the least made it clear that once one has
discarded simplistic accounts of what equality
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is, then the whole process of giving an
adequate account becomes rather
complicated. We shouldn't find that too
daunting. The world is, after all, a rather
complicated place.
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Notes
1. Wittgenstein 1968: sec. 115. It should
be obvious that the whole character of part I
of this paper is inspired by the P hiIosophical
Investigations; such specific cross-references
as seem useful are indicated in parentheses
by section number, e.g. PIllS.
2. I would like to thank Vincent Browne,
G.A. Cohen, and R.M. Hare for their
comments on a previous draft of part 1 of this
paper, which was presented to the XVIII
World Congress of Philosophy. The ideas in
part II of this paper have developed through
several incarnations and with many people's
help. I would particularly like to thank Brian
Barry, G.A. Cohen, Keith Graham, Attracta
Ingram, Richard Norman, Prasanta Pattanaik,
Jennifer Todd and Philippe Van Parijs for
their advice and criticism. I also wish to
thank the Department of Philosophy at the
State University of New York at Stony Brook
for granting me a research associateship for
the year 1991-92 and the Center for the Study
of Ethics at Western Michigan University for
their warm welcome and for helpful
comments on this paper when delivered. Part
II is based on a section of my paper 'An
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Egalitarian Case for Basic Income', in Van
Parijs 1992 and appears with the kind
permission of the editor.
3. The conception of egalitarianism as
equal well-being endorsed by Landesman
(1983) is more sophisticated than Mortimore's
and more sensitive to real-world
egalitarianism. But while I see 'equal well-
being' or (for preference) 'equality of
condition' as a way of summarizing a plurality
of views, Landesman sees 'equal well-being'
as a 'root' principle which those ideas merely
elaborate. This picture of the conceptual
landscape seems to me a distortion stemming
from the philosophical inclinations criticised
in this paper.
4. Recent examples are Arneson 1989
and Cohen 1989. These theories are much
more complicated than those discussed in the
text and would take much more space to
unravel, but I believe that neither fully
captures the egalitarian outlook.
5. It was not always so, as I.S. Mill's
endorsement of plural voting demonstrates
(1972: ch 8). Yet Mill was clearly an
egalitarian in his day.
6. A recent exception is Gilbert 1990;
see pp. 277-283, 332-332. Carens (1981) uses
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strictly equal incomes for analytical purposes,
without committing himself to this as a basic
principle. In Carens 1985 he argues that there
is no practical difference between equal
incomes and compensatory ones because
under existing and likely conditions both
principles imply the same policy of
progressive taxation and redistribution.
7. lowe this suggestion to Philippe Van
Parijs.
8. I would like to thank Prasanta
Pattanaik for kindly leading me towards this
point. Let me apologize now to people who
find the next few pages unbearably simple.
9. The slight slope in S represents the
assumption that subsistence needs increase
with work. S is not a compensation curve
because working longer hours for subsistence
is more burdensome than working shorter
hours for it.
10. For the sake of simplicity, the
discussion here and for the rest of the paper
assumes that labour is the only factor of
production, and obviously needs refining for
an economy with other inputs. Without
wanting to anticipate such refinements, it is
worth pointing out that most egalitarians are
unimpressed by the argument that returns to
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capital represent compensation for deferred
consumption and thus would resist the use of
the principle of compensation to justify such
returns. This is, indeed, one of the reasons
why egalitarians tend to be socialists. The
questions all of this raises for the
arrangements for investment in a socialist
economy are serious, but well beyond the
scope of this paper.
11. It is more plausible to assume that an
optimal distribution must at least be Pareto-
optimal, although that would need to be
argued for, too. It would be easy to show that
the simple examples put forward in this
section are not Pareto-optimal on all possible
sets of preferences, but more difficult, I hope,
to show that a complex system of
compensating differentials in an actual
society would be substantially Pareto-
suboptimal.
12. I am thus putting to one side the very
serious objections to compensatory justice
raised by Carens 1985. I am not sure that
these objections can be overcome, but I do
think that the ideas in this paper give a
stronger sense to the idea of compensation
than the treatment in Carens's article.
13. There is a curious anomaly about
work and income in Rawls's overall theory.
Rawls says that justice has to do with
distributing the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation, but the two principles concern
only the benefits -- the primary goods. So
they only cover half the question, and in
particular fail to distinguish inequalities of
income which compensate for inequalities of
work (or, indeed, of need) from those which
represent differences in overall economic
condition.
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